T his paper defines invariant utility functions to continuous monotonic transformations. We also define transformation invariance as the condition in which the certain equivalent of a lottery follows a continuous monotonic transformation that is applied to its outcomes. We show that invariant utility functions uniquely satisfy transformation invariance, and we illustrate how knowledge of an invariance criterion determines the functional form of the utility function. This formulation extends the widely used notions of invariance to shift and scale transformations on the outcomes of a lottery to more general monotonic transformations. Moreover, we interpret any continuous and strictly monotonic utility function as an invariant utility function to a composite monotonic transformation. Furthermore, we show how this composite transformation uniquely characterizes the utility function up to a linear transformation. We derive the invariance formulations that lead to the assignment of hyperbolic absolute risk-averse (HARA) utility functions, linear plus exponential utility functions, and a twoparameter power-logarithmic utility function that generalizes the logarithmic utility function. We work through several examples to illustrate the approach.
Introduction
and Pratt (1964) defined the notions of constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion. They showed that the only continuous utility functions that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion are the linear and exponential utility functions. In earlier work, Pfanzagl (1959) also discussed linear and exponential utility functions, and showed that when the outcomes of a lottery are increased by an amount , these utility functions lead to an increase in the certain equivalent of the lottery by the same amount . Howard (1967) and Raiffa (1968) referred to this property as the "delta property." In our formulation, we refer to this property as "invariance to shift transformations. " Arrow and Pratt also showed that the only continuous utility functions that exhibit constant relative risk aversion are the logarithmic and power utility functions. For a decision maker who has constant relative risk aversion, it is known that when the prospects of a lottery are scaled by , the certain equivalent of the lottery is also scaled by . In our formulation, we refer to this property as "invariance to scale transformations."
The ideas of invariance to both shift and scale have found widespread use in decision analysis to determine the functional form of a utility function or to simplify the certain equivalent and value of information calculations. In this paper, we extend this analysis to more general monotonic transformations. To provide some motivation for this work, consider a decision maker who faces a lottery and values it at a certain equivalent, x. Suppose the lottery is modified by applying a monotonic transformation, g x , to all of its outcomes, where is a transformation parameter. If the decision maker's certain equivalent of the modified lottery becomes g x , we say the decision maker has "transformation invariance" to the given transformation, and we illustrate how to derive the functional form of his utility function. Special cases of this formulation include shift transformations when g x = x + and scale transformations when g x = x. We also define an "invariant utility function" to a transformation, g, when the utility function, U , is linearly related to the composite transformation U g . We then provide a functional equation for determin-ing the functional form of the utility function, given the transformation g to which it is invariant.
To illustrate the basic idea behind invariant utility functions, consider a situation where we have a utility function, U x x , for attribute x, which is the length of a square swimming pool. Suppose we wish to determine the utility function for the area of the swimming pool, U A A , A = x 2 . Consistency requires that the units in which we solve the problem should not change the decision alternative, and so U A A and U x x should be linearly related, i.e.,
where k and d do not depend on either A or x. Taking the first partial derivative of both sides of (1) with respect to x and using the chain rule for partial derivatives gives
where u x and u A are the first derivatives of the utility functions for x and A, respectively. In general, the functions u A and u x can be significantly different. The question that arises is whether there is a functional form of u x that remains the same in both coordinate systems. If such a form does exist, we say it is invariant to this power transformation and derive this functional form by setting u A x = u x x = u x in (2) to get
The solution to (3) yields the invariant utility function to the power transformation, A = x 2 . We return to this problem and derive the solution to (3) in §3.3.1.
Using the definitions above, we then show that invariant utility functions to a monotonic transformation g x uniquely satisfy transformation invariance when the monetary outcomes of a lottery are modified by g x . This result enables us to determine the functional form of a utility function by knowledge of a transformation invariance criterion. To illustrate this approach, we derive the functional form of the utility function that satisfies transformation invariance with power transformations. We also derive the monotonic transformations that lead to the assignment of hyperbolic absolute risk-averse (HARA) utility functions.
Next, we extend the invariance analysis to composite transformations of the form g 2 g 1 x 1 2 . We discuss what is implied about a decision maker's utility function by knowledge of transformation invariance to composite shift and scale (or to composite power and scale) transformations. We also show that any continuous and strictly monotonic utility function can be expressed as an invariant utility function to a composite transformation. We then show that this invariant composite transformation uniquely characterizes all strategically equivalent utility functions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic definitions that will be used in the remaining sections of the paper and a proposition to determine the functional form of a utility function by knowledge of an invariance criterion. Section 3 derives the utility functions that satisfy transformation invariance with some common monotonic transformations. Section 4 presents invariance to twoparameter transformations and proves that a monotonic utility function can be expressed as an invariant utility function to a composite transformation.
Basic Definitions and the Invariance Formulation
In this section we present the notation and definitions that will be used in the remaining sections of the paper. We assume in all of our analyses that the decision maker follows the axioms of normative utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) , and has a continuous and strictly monotonic (strictly increasing or strictly decreasing) utility function, U x , over a connected domain, D, that covers all monetary values considered. If the utility function is differentiable, we use the term u x to denote the first derivative of the utility function. We also use continuous monotonic transformations of the form, g x , where is a transformation parameter. We assume g x is strictly monotonic with x for all x ∈ D, ∈ min max , min < max , and if its first partial derivative with x exists, then
From here on, we use the term "prospect" of a lottery to denote the total wealth, i.e., the outcome of the Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 26 June 2015, at 11:14 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Transformation Invariance
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The certain equivalent of a lottery follows the same monotonic transformation that is applied to its prospects.
lottery plus the decision maker's initial wealth. Now we make the following definition. Definition 1 (Transformation Invariance). A decision maker is said to satisfy transformation invariance to a continuous monotonic transformation, g x , over a set , ∈ , if for each lottery p 1 x 1 p 2 x 2 p n x n and for each ∈ , the certain equivalent prospect of a transformed lottery p 1 g x 1 p 2 g x 2 p n g x n is equal to g x , where x is the certain equivalent prospect of the unmodified lottery.
An example of transformation invariance is shown in Figure 1 . We assume that the domain, D, of the utility function covers all prospects of the unmodified lottery and all prospects of the lotteries modified using any feasible value of ∈ , for which the decision maker satisfies invariance, i.e., we assume
In Appendix 1, we show that if a decision maker follows the axioms of utility theory and if he satisfies transformation invariance for a monotonic transformation, g x , and a given lottery, then he must also satisfy transformation invariance with the same transformation for all other lotteries whose modified prospects lie on the domain, D.
The question we seek to answer now is "What does knowledge of transformation invariance tell us about a decision maker's utility function?" Before we answer this question, we make the following definition.
Definition 2 (Invariant Utility Function). A utility function, U x , is invariant to a continuous monotonic transformation, g x , for all values of over a set, , if it satisfies the functional equation
where k and d can be functions of but not of x. Equation (5) shows that the definition of an invariant utility function asserts thatthe utility values before and after the transformation must be related by a linear transformation. As we shall see, Equation (5) may have different solutions depending on the set for which it is satisfied. We discuss these solutions in more detail in §3.
If both the utility function and the monotonic transformation are differentiable, then the definition of an invariant utility function can also be written in derivative forms as
The following fundamental proposition relates transformation invariance and invariant utility functions. Proof. See Appendix 1. Proposition 1 derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for transformation invariance to continuous monotonic transformations, and converts knowledge of transformation invariance into the solution of the functional Equation (5). The lotteries used to test for transformation invariance can have binary outcomes (for simplicity) or any number of outcomes.
Proposition 1 extends the notions of invariance to shift and scale transformations to more general monotonic transformations of the form g x , and does not pose any restrictions on the set for which invariance must be satisfied. We observe that previous literature on invariance to shift transformations (Pfanzagl 1959) derived solutions that are invariant to values of on an interval of positive length. As we shall see, invariance to discrete values of the parameter leads to more general functional forms of utility functions that are continuous, strictly increasing, and are also invariant to shift transformations. We discuss the implications of this result in §3.
When g x is strictly increasing with x, Proposition 1 generalizes the notion of zero-switch utility functions (Bell 1988) , which preserve the rank order of any two lotteries with increase in wealth. To illustrate this further, we make the following corollary. is strictly increasing with x, ∀ ∈ , ∀ x g x ∈ D, then his rank order for any two lotteries will not change with any value of ∈ after the transformation g x is applied to the prospects of the lotteries he is facing.
Proof. If the decision maker's utility function is invariant to g x , then the certain equivalent of each lottery follows this continuous monotonic transformation ∀ ∈ . If x 1 , x 2 are the certain equivalents of the first and second lottery (respectively) and if x 1 > x 2 , the strictly increasing monotonicity condition of g x asserts that g x 1 > g x 2 , ∀ ∈ , x 1 x 2 ∈ D, and he is guaranteed to preserve the rank order of the two lotteries when modified by the transformation g x ∀ ∈ . Note that if the utility function is invariant to a strictly decreasing transformation, then the rank order of any two lotteries will always change with any value of ∈ when modified by the transformation g x .
Determining the Functional Form of a Utility Function
In this section, we present several applications of Proposition 1 to determine the functional form of a utility function that is invariant to a given monotonic transformation. For simplicity of expression, we will assume that the monotonic transformations and the utility functions are differentiable in this section, and will use the derivative form of Equation (6) in our analysis.
Invariance to Scale Transformations
From Proposition 1, the utility function(s) that satisfies transformation invariance to a scale transformation g x = x must satisfy
We now highlight two important cases for the solution of the functional equation (7): (i) when transformation invariance holds for only a particular scale value of = c, and (ii) when transformation invariance holds for all scale values, , on an interval of positive length, i.e., = min max , min < max . As we shall see, the two solutions are not equivalent.
Invariance Holds for All Values of on an Interval of Positive Length,
= min max . In this case, Equation (7) must apply to x ∈ D and ∈ min max . Both x and are variables on intervals of positive length. If we define z = k / and substitute into (7), we get
Equation (8) is a well-known functional equation of two variables called the Pexider equation (Pexider 1903) , whose solution has the form
where a and b are arbitrary constants that do not depend on x. For more information about solutions to generalized Pexider equations and precautions about the domains of x , see Aczél (1966 Aczél ( or 1987 . Substituting from (9) into (7) shows that the value of b = ln k / ln − 1.
Equation (9) integrates to either a power or a logarithmic utility function, depending on the value of b. This result is consistent with the well-known results of scale invariance for constant relative risk aversion (Arrow 1965 , Pratt 1964 
Because the value of c is fixed in (10), then k c must also be a fixed constant. Thus, Equation (10) is a functional equation of only one variable, x (as opposed to (7), which is a function of two variables, x and ). We present the solution to this functional equation below.
Proposition 2. A decision maker with a differentiable and strictly monotonic utility function satisfies transformation invariance to a particular scale amount, c, if and only if the first derivative of his utility function satisfies
where p · is any periodic function with period equal to one. To illustrate the generality of (11), we observe, for example, that the function
satisfies transformation invariance for a scale factor of 2. Examples of continuous, strictly increasing utility functions that correspond to (12) are shown in Figure 2 for k = 1 7 2 3. For the special case where the periodic function, p · , is identically equal to one, Equation (11) reduces to the case of constant relative risk aversion. Proposition 2 shows that it is not sufficient to assert constant relative risk aversion by knowledge of transformation invariance to only a particular scale value. This result should be highlighted in practice. Furthermore, we now demonstrate that a decision maker can be invariant to an infinite number of scale values and still not have constant relative risk aversion.
Corollary 2. A differentiable and monotonic utility function that satisfies transformation invariance for a scale amount, c, satisfies transformation invariance for all integer powers of c.
Proof. If a decision maker satisfies (11) and faces a modified lottery whose prospects are scaled by c i , where i is any integer, we have
where k c = c i ln k/ ln c −1 is a constant. Equation (13) shows that u x is invariant to the transformation c i x (i.e., all integer powers of c .
Corollary 2 shows that a decision maker can satisfy scale invariance to the infinite sequence, c
etc., and still not have a logarithmic or a power utility function. If we wish to assert constant relative risk aversion with transformation invariance, then we need to test the assertion with scale values other than those in this infinite sequence.
Invariance to Shift Transformations
From Proposition 1, the utility function that is invariant to a shift transformation, g x = x + must satisfy
Once again, we distinguish between two cases: (i) invariance to all values of on an interval of positive length, = min max , and (ii) invariance to only discrete values of .
If (14) applies for all ∈ min max , min < max , then we can make the substitutions x = ln t and = ln y to get
Now we define w t = u ln t , and substitute into (15) to get w yt = k y w t
Equation (16) 
where a and b are constants. Substituting back for t = e x , and w t = u ln t into (17), gives
Substituting for (18) into (14) gives a value of k = e b . Equation (18) = 1, we have several solutions that satisfy the invariance criterion, all of which belong to the exponential family. This result is consistent with Pfanzagl (1959) , where linear and exponential utility functions imply invariance to all shift amounts over an interval of positive length.
In Appendix 2, we show that invariance to only a particular shift value, = 0 , leads to more general functional forms of utility functions whose first derivative satisfies
where is a constant and p · is any periodic function with period equal to one. Consequently, it is not sufficient to test with a particular shift amount and assert constant absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, it is not sufficient to test with even an infinite sequence of integer multiples of and assert that a decision maker has constant absolute risk aversion because the solution to the particular shift amount, 0 , must also be invariant to all of its integer multiples:
where k 0 = e − i 0 = constant. A decision maker can thus satisfy transformation invariance for all shift amounts of 0 = $100 increments; i.e., 0 = $100 2 0 = $200 100 0 = $10 000 and still have neither an exponential nor a linear utility function over this interval.
Invariance to Monotonic Power
Transformations From Proposition 1, the utility function that is invariant to a power transformation g x = x , ∀ ∈ min max , min < max , must satisfy
Once again, we distinguish between the two cases: (i) invariance to all values of on an interval of positive length, = min max , and (ii) invariance to only discrete values of . 
where and a are arbitrary constants.
Proof. See Appendix 3. By integration, we can write the utility function that corresponds to (23) as either
where x 0 is the outcome of a lottery, w is the initial wealth, and a, b, and are arbitrary constants. Equation (24) provides a two-parameter power-logarithmic utility function (with parameters and w). Equation (25) provides a log-log family of utility functions. The risk-aversion function (Arrow 1965 , Pratt 1964 asserted by (23) is equal to
From (26), we see that for x > 1, and ≤ 1, u x exhibits decreasing risk aversion; and for x > 1 and > 1 it exhibits increasing risk aversion. For the special case where = 1, Equation (24) reduces to the logarithmic utility function
with a risk-aversion function x = 1/x. Referring back to the swimming pool example in the introduction, we can now assert that if the decision maker has a power-logarithmic utility function, then his utility function over the length of the swimming pool will be linearly related to his utility funcDownloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 26 June 2015, at 11:14 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. tion over its area, and he will also have the same value of in both coordinate systems. That is,
3.3.2. Invariance to a Single Power Value, m. Following the approach taken in the proof of Proposition 2, it is relatively straightforward to show that when power invariance occurs for only a particular value of = m, then (23) has an additional periodic component,
where p · is a periodic function of period equal to one. Proof. The proof is substantially similar to the two proofs in Appendix 2, and hence is omitted.
Hyperbolic Absolute Risk-Averse (HARA)
Utility Functions Suppose a decision maker does not satisfy transformation invariance for any scale amounts. However, he states that if his initial wealth is modified by a fixed amount, 0 (which could be positive or negative) then he would satisfy transformation invariance for all scale amounts on an interval of positive length. To achieve this new wealth level, the decision maker can borrow a fixed amount, 0 , and pay it back after the scaled prospect is revealed. This situation is represented by the following modified scale transformation.
We derive the utility function that is invariant to this transformation below. Equation (30) provides us with an interpretation for the ratio of the parameters and for a decision maker with a HARA utility function. This ratio is the amount by which his initial wealth needs to be modified such that he will be invariant to scale transformations. For the special case of 0 = 0, the decision maker satisfies scale invariance at his current wealth level, and (30) leads to the assignment of a utility function whose first derivative has the power functional form. Because (30) does not depend on the actual values of the parameters and , but on their ratio, all HARA utility functions with the same ratio / = 0 must also satisfy transformation invariance with this transformation.
Proposition 4. A decision maker with a differentiable and strictly monotonic utility function satisfies transformation invariance to (30) at a given value of
Note that (30) has only one parameter, , that can be varied if we wish to satisfy transformation invariance (the value of 0 is fixed). Changing the value of 0 to 1 in (30) will not provide transformation invariance if the parameters and of the HARA utility function have a ratio equal to 0 .
Invariance with Two-Parameter Transformations
A differentiable utility function is invariant to a twoparameter differentiable transformation, g x , over sets if
where k does not depend on x. If g x is strictly monotonic with x, and if a utility function is invariant to this strictly monotonic transformation, then we have two parameters, and , that we can vary independently and still satisfy transformation invariance. A special case of this two-parameter transformation is a composite transformation, g 2 g 1 x , which is constructed from two individual transformations g 1 x and g 2 x . Composite transformations can also be constructed Downloaded from informs.org by [128.125.124 .17] on 26 June 2015, at 11:14 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Decision Analysis 4(1), pp. 17-31, © 2007 INFORMS from more than two individual transformations, but our focus in this section will be on the two-parameter case.
As we shall see, invariance to composite transformations can significantly reduce the space of possible utility functions that we can assign in a given problem. In addition, we can interpret any continuous and strictly monotonic utility function as an invariant utility function to a composite transformation, g 2 g 1 x .
Relating the Solutions of Composite and Individual Transformations
To illustrate the use of composite transformations, consider a decision maker who is invariant to composite shift and scale. For example, suppose a decision maker faces a lottery, but then realizes that he will receive its outcomes with some time delay corresponding to a certain scaling discount factor, , but will also receive some additional monetary compensation, , for this delay. If his certain equivalent for the lottery follows the same transformations for shift and scale over intervals of positive length, = min max , = min max , what does this tell us about his utility function?
Proposition 5. A decision maker with a differentiable and strictly monotonic utility function satisfies transformation invariance to a composite shift and scale transformation on intervals of positive length if and only if he is risk neutral.
Proof. See Appendix 5. Invariance to the composite shift and scale transformation reduces the set of feasible solutions to only one possible solution. In Appendix 6, we build on the results of Proposition 5 and show that a decision maker with a differential and strictly monotonic utility function satisfies transformation invariance to a composite power and scale transformation,
if and only if he has a logarithmic utility function. While the invariant utility functions for composite shift and scale (and composite power and scale) transformations are the intersections of the feasible solutions for each of the individual transformations, this is not always the case. To highlight the relation between the solutions of the individual and composite transformations, we make the following two propositions.
Proposition 6. If a utility function is invariant to each of the individual transformations, g 1 x and g 2 x , then it is also invariant to the composite transformation,
Proof. From (5), invariance to the composite transformation, g 2 g 1 x , requires
If u x is invariant to both g 1 x and g 2 x , then
where k 1 , k 2 do not depend on x. Comparing (34) and (33) shows k = k 1 k 2 , and so u x is invariant to the composite transformation g 2 g 1 x . Proposition 6 asserts that if the individual transformations have a common invariant solution, then this common solution must also be an invariant solution to the composite transformation. The converse of Proposition 6, however, is not true; i.e., it is not a necessary condition that the solution to a composite transformation must be a solution to each of the individual transformations. To provide a simple counterexample, consider the two transformations, g 1 x = e x and g 2 x = ln x , which lead to the composite transformation, g 2 g 1 x = x. We can verify that the function, u x = ax b is invariant to this composite transformation, because the left-hand side of (33) We can, however, characterize the reverse regularity condition that relates the solutions of composite and individual transformations using the following proposition.
Proposition 7. If a utility function is invariant to the composite transformation, g 2 g 1 x
, and is invariant to any of the individual transformations, say g 1 x , then it is also invariant to the second transformation, g 2 x .
Proof. See Appendix 7. Proposition 7 asserts that a solution to the composite transformation is either invariant to both of the individual transformations or is invariant to neither one.
The Invariant Transformation of a Given
Utility Function In the previous sections, we discussed utility functions that are invariant to a given monotonic transformation. Now we discuss the inverse problem: "Given a continuous and strictly monotonic utility function, U x , what is the transformation, g, for which it satisfies transformation invariance?" As we shall see, the solution to this problem is simpler than that of the previous problem, and any continuous and strictly monotonic utility function can be expressed as an invariant utility function to a composite transformation. We also show that the invariant composite transformation of a given utility function provides a consistency check for the functional form of the utility function and the assessed parameters of its functional form.
4.2.1. General Expression for the Invariant Transformation of U x . If a utility function is invariant to a monotonic transformation, g, it should satisfy
where k and d do not depend on x.
If the utility function is continuous and strictly increasing (or strictly decreasing), and if the term kU x + d on the right-hand side of (35) lies on the range of U x ∀ x ∈ D, and for the chosen arbitrary values of k and d, then we can take the utility inverse of both sides of (35) to get
From (36), the transformation g is thus a function of three variables, x, k, d, and can be written either as a general two-parameter transformation, g = g x k d , or more specifically as a composite transformation, g = g 2 g 1 x k d , where
The domain of feasibility of the three variables x, k, d in g x k d is specified by the condition that kU x + d falls on the range of U x . With the definition of the invariant composite transformation in (36) or (37), two questions naturally arise: the first, does this invariant transformation change by applying a linear transformation to the utility function? And second, does the composite transformation uniquely characterizes the given utility function? We answer these questions using the following proposition. 
if and only if they are related by a linear transformation,
Proof. See Appendix 8. Equation (38) relates the composite transformations of two linearly related utility functions. Note that the scale parameter, k, is identical on both sides of (38) eff , in a similar way as the risk-aversion function, x , characterizes utility functions uniquely up to a linear transformation. We now present several examples in which we derive the invariant transformation of a given utility function.
Invariant
Transformation for an Exponential Utility Function. We know that an exponential utility function, U x = −e − 0 x , must be invariant to a shift transformation. The question we now ask is whether this particular utility function satisfies transformation invariance for any other transformation? If such a transformation does exist, then from (36) it can be written as
Equation (39) defines an invariant two-parameter transformation for an exponential utility function with risk-aversion coefficient 0 , showing that a given exponential utility function satisfies transformation invariance for more than just a shift transformation. The transformation in (38) is specific to the value of the risk-aversion coefficient 0 . Knowledge of transformation invariance with the composite transformation (39) asserts both the exponential form of the utility function and the value of its risk aversion coefficient. When d = 0, (39) reduces to the singleparameter shift transformation, g 1 x k 1 = x + k 1 , where k 1 = − 1/ 0 ln k is an arbitrary shift parameter. As such, it is satisfied by all exponential utility functions. Applying a linear transformation to the utility function yields
Defining
Comparing (39) and (41) shows the equivalence of the invariant composite transformations for two linearly related utility functions.
Invariant Transformation for a Hyperbolic
Absolute Risk-Averse Utility Function. From (36) the invariant transformation for a HARA utility, U x = + x 1−1/ , must satisfy
Equation (42) defines an invariant transformation for which any HARA utility function with parameters and must satisfy transformation invariance. Once again, this composite transformation can be used as a consistency check on the assessed values of these parameters, and is, therefore, a stronger condition than invariance to the single-parameter transformation. For the special case where d = 0, Equation (42) reduces to
where
, which applies to all HARA utility functions with 0 = / , as discussed above. When = 1, we have, U x = log + x , whose invariant composite transformation can be determined by setting, log
k − , which is a composite power-scale transformation modified by the shift amount, .
4.2.4. Invariant Transformation for a One-Switch Utility Function. If the inverse function, x = U −1 t , in (36) or (37) does not have a closed-form expression, we can still derive the invariant transformation numerically to provide a consistency check for the assessed parameters of its functional form. Consider, for example, the family of linear-plus-exponential utility functions (Bell 1988) . The inverse of a given linear-plusexponential utility function, such as U x = x − e −x , does not have a closed-form expression. However, its invariant transformation, g, must satisfy
For given values of x, k, d, we can substitute into (44) and obtain the corresponding value of g numerically. Figure 3 
Conclusions
Invariance formulations have found widespread use in statistical physics, thermodynamics, wave propagation, and several other fields. In this paper we presented an invariance approach for reasoning about utility functions, focusing on two main problems. The first finds the functional form of a utility function that is invariant to a given transformation, and the second finds the functional form of the invariant transformation for a given utility function. For any continuous and strictly monotonic utility function, U x , we showed that the transformation, g x k d = U −1 kU x + d , has a significant meaning: It is the composite transformation for which this utility function satisfies transformation invariance. We demonstrated that this composite transformation characterizes a utility function uniquely up to a linear transformation, and that it can be used as a consistency check for the chosen functional form of the utility function and for its assessed parameters.
The characterization of a utility function based on its invariant composite transformation presents a correspondence to the characterization based on the risk-aversion function. Given a risk-aversion function, x , it is straightforward to determine the utility function, U x , up to a linear transformation, from which we can also determine the invariant composite transformation, g 2 g 1 x k d . This correspondence also applies in the reverse direction; starting from g 2 g 1 x k d we derive U x by solving the composite invariance functional equation, from which we can calculate the risk-aversion function if the utility function is twice differentiable.
The invariance approach to reasoning about utility functions leads to several directions for future research that are analogous to those developed for the risk-aversion function. For example, we assumed in this paper that the decision maker follows the axioms of expected utility theory. As Pfanzagl (1959) points out in his original paper, however, "if the consistency axiom is not valid, then a more thorough investigation would be needed in order to determine the real meaning of the utility functions obtained by experiments with gambling." Indeed, when asked about invariance formulations, decision makers may well be inconsistent, and they may deviate significantly from utility theory. Future work can focus on the development and comparison of different assessment methods for verifying transformation invariance, and on methods to incorporate inconsistent responses from decision makers into the invariance formulations.
A normative perspective also points to future research directions. For example, (i) the extensions of transformation invariance to multiple attributes; (ii) the derivation of invariant multiattribute utility functions that lead to zero-switching preferences between multivariate lotteries when monotonic transformations are applied to their outcomes; and (iii) the utility independence relations that are asserted in multiattribute utility functions by knowledge of invariance to multivariate transformations. Future work may also derive (iv) the functional forms of utility functions that lead to a maximum of one-switch (and n-switch) preferences between two given lotteries when continuous monotonic transformations, g x , are applied to the lottery outcomes.
